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ARTICLES
THE FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL CONFLICT-
WHAT'S A LAWYER TO SAY?
C. Evan Stewart*
At different stages in his long legal career Oliver Wendell
Holmes espoused a range of views on the First Amendment. At one
point he wrote: "I... probably take the extremist view in favor of
free speech;" at another he opined: "the 1st Amendment... cannot
have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language."' The conceptual tension reflected
in those views is concretely demonstrated when the exercise of First
Amendment rights comes up against a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court, describing the right to
a fair trial as "the most fundamental of all freedoms," has made
clear that where there is an "irreconcilable conflict" between the
two Amendments the Sixth is supreme.2
Conflict between the two Amendments often arises in the area of
extra-judicial speech by attorneys. Although there is a Disciplinary
Rule (7-107) that addresses this issue, some attorneys are either una-
ware of the Rule, or view it as anachronistic and/or unenforceable
in this era of intense media interest in and exposure of well-known
criminal trials (e.g., Claus von Bulow; Joel B. Steinberg).3 Yet, at
the same time, many within and outside the profession are expres-
sing increased concern about trying cases in the press, the use of
media consultants, and the like; such tactics are viewed as un-
seemly and unprofessional. 4 Courts, reluctant to enforce DR 7-
* General Counsel, Nikko Securities, B.A. 1974, Cornell University; J.D.
1977, Cornell University.
1. 0. W. Holmes, II Holmes-Pollock Letters 29 (1946); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). In the same year Justice Holmes made the latter
observation, he also wrote his famous opinion in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919)("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre, and causing a panic. It does not even
protect a man for an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of
force.").
2. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); accord Shepard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966).
3. Indeed, lawyers are taking crash courses on how to deal with the media.
See P. Schwab, Talking to the Press, LroaoN 26 (Vol. 12, No. 4, Summer 1986).
4. One of the most egregious public comments came when Joel B. Steinberg's
principal defense lawyer predicted his client's conviction during the trial; that the
lawyer was proved correct does not justify his extraordinary action. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
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107, are instead resorting to other methods of ensuring a fair trial,
including: sealing documents, issuing gag orders, holding secret
hearings and attempting to limit the access of the media to sensitive
information.6
The current state of extra-judicial speech is well illustrated in the
depicted cartoon from the popular Bloom County cartoon strip.7
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In response to this situation the American Bar Association has pro-
posed a different disciplinary rule in its Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Rule 3.6). Prominent bar associations have also issued re-
ports on how to deal with the question, often with conflicting conclu-
sions. 8 Perhaps this is an appropriate time to examine the free press-
fair trial conflict, try to understand what is at stake and see what
could improve the situation.
INTERESTS AT STAKE
There are innumerable Constitutional, governmental and societal
interests involved in the free press-fair trial issue. Besides a def end-
ant's Sixth Amendment right and a lawyer's First Amendment right,
which have been already identified, they include:
5. See N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1987, at 1, 2 (federal judges in charge of lawyer disci-
pline committees in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York were unaware
of any lawyers sanctioned).
6. See Wall Street Journal, Apr. 24, 1989, at B5B (Federal Judge John M.
Walker, in the criminal tax case against Leona and Harry Helmaley, entered an
order barring attorneys, defendants and witnesses from discussing "the case, or any
sub~ject or aspect thereof, or decision relating thereto, with the press or media.");
see also New York Times, Feb. 8, 1988, at B1, col. 2. Because of the increasingly
widespread use of gag orders, the U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District of
New York has prepared a blanket memorandum to oppose their imposition, except
in extreme circumstances. See R. Rosenwein, F/urry of Gag Orders Worries 1st
Amendment Experts, Manhattan Lawyer 4, July 18, 1989.
7. Reprinted with permission of Berke Breathed and copyright Washington
Post.
8. Compare, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Pretrial Publicity, Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York (1986) with Report of the Federal Bar Coun-
cil Committee on Second Circuit Courts Concerning Extrajudicial Statements of
Attorneys in Federal Criminal Cases, Federal Bar Council (1987).
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(i) a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process of law;
(i) the state's interest in even-handed justice;
(iii) the public's interest in having access to information about
threats to its safety and steps taken by the criminal justice system
to assure its security;
(iv) the judicial interest in a court's inherent power to oversee and
control pending matters;
(v) the privacy interest of those who may be implicated in some
way (including the victim and his or her family); and
(vi) the media's interest in informing the public.
These are all significant interests, and they frame how each per-
son, institution or interest group analyzes the issue(s) of whether and
how much of an attorney's extra-judicial speech jeopardizes some-
one's right to a fair trial. The breadth of these often conflicting in-
terests makes clear that this is not merely an esoteric ethical point,
with implications limited to the legal profession.9
RESTRAINING EXTRA-JUDICIAL ATTORNEY SPEECH:
ITS HISTORY AND SCOPE
DR 7-107 is a relatively new Disciplinary Rule. It was inspired by
two Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1960s,' 0 as well as the
Warren Commission's expressed concern, in the aftermath of Presi-
dent Kennedy's assassination, about balancing the public's right to
know and the accused's right to a free trial.11 Thus, rather than be-
ing a throw-back to a pre-media era, DR 7-107 was introduced just
as the media era was exploding, and was designed to address this
precise phenomenon.
9. More generally, the escalating interplay between the media and the legal
profession has lead to bizarre episodes like Oliver North's criminal trial, where be-
cause of the months of intensive media coverage of the Iran-Contra crises and re-
sulting Congressional hearings (which included North's televised, immunized
testimony) any potential juror was struck if he or she had read, heard or seen any-
thing about the Iran-Contra matter. As a result, the jury panel, which was charged
with evaluating very complicated matters involving the Executive and Legislative
branches of the federal government consisted of people who had no knowledge of
current aflairs. See T. Draper, "Revelations of the North Trial," The New York Re-
view of Books 54, Aug. 17, 1989.
The oddity of such a situation is heightened by the fact that it is directly contrary
to the initial conception of how the jury system was to work; members of the jury
were expected to be fully conversant with the facts of the case prior to trial. See 2
Po, ocx and MALNm, The History of English Law, 621-22 (2d ed. 1909).
10. See note 2 supra. For a general history of the interplay of the media and the
judicial process in the United States prior to the 1960s, see Mueller, Problems
Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1 (1961);
much of the bar's attention prior to the adoption of DR 7-107 focused on the issue
of whether to permit radio broadcasting and/or televising of trials. See, e.g., 42
A.B.A.J. 834, 838, 843 (1956)(reporting on the Special Bar-Media Conference
Committee on Fair Trial-Free Press).
11. ABA SrimDs RELATINo To FAr TRL AND FiEz Pitss 19, 19 n.l (1968).
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The Rule restricts extra-judicial attorney speech in a number of
areas: criminal investigations, criminal actions, civil actions, admin-
istrative proceedings. Not surprisingly, the most controversial and
litigated areas relate to the criminal process. Within that process
DR 7-107 recognizes four separate stages: (1) pre-arrest or indict-
ment, (2) post-arrest or indictment (but pre-jury selection), (3) trial
(including jury selection), and (4) post-verdict (until sentencing).
In each of the first two stages the Rule details what information an
attorney may and may not pass out in public. The matters on which
lawyers may comment are limited, straightforward and unexcep-
tional;I2 there has not been too much controversy about the Rule as
applied to these stages."3
As to the latter two stages, there are no specific "dos" and
"don'ts." Rather, those sub-parts of the Rule set forth a somewhat
subjective standard: whether the extra-judicial speech is "reason-
ably likely to interfere with a fair trial;" applying this has been con-
troversial. While some courts have upheld the "reasonably likely"
standard from First Amendment challenge, 14 others have rejected it
on that ground and have adopted instead a standard of "serious andimminent threat" to the administration of justice;" s and still others
have utilized a standard whereby the test is whether the extra-judi-
cial speech is a "clear and present danger" to the administration of
justice.1 6 Without belittling the importance of establishing the cor-
rect First Amendment standard under which speech may be re-
strained,"7 this debate, in my view, does not address the real issue.
12. What speech is allowed at the first stage (DR 7-107 (A)) is, not surprisingly,
directed principally to prosecutors. The second stage (DR 7-107 (B)) applies
equally to prosecution and defense lawyers, and is quite explicit in what may or
may not be said in public.
13. Where the first two stages have been controversial, such controversy has
been sparked by certain prosecutors' excessive media exposure, so-called "speak-
ing" indictments read to the television audience and leaks by unidentified govern-
ment officials about the progress of investigations. See S. Arkin, Prosecutors' Use
of Discretion and Abuse - EHect of Leaks, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1987, at 1; S. Arkin,
Government Leaks - Breach of Investigative Confidentiality, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8,
1987, at 1. Excepting leaks, so long as a prosecutor stays within the boundaries of
DR 7-107 (A) & (B), such speech should be tolerated, at a minimum, on the ground
that the public is entitled to be aware of whether and the extent to which the crimi-
nal justice system is working to ensure justice and community safety.
14. Eg. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Hinds, 449
A.2d 483 (N.J. 1982).
15. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 552 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
16. In re Markfield, 49 A.D.2d 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1st Dept.), appeal dis-
missed, 37 N.Y. 734, 375 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1975).
17. Whether there is, in fact, a constitutionally significant difference between
these standards appears doubtful. See A Constitutional Assessment of Court Rules
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ENFORCEMENT
As stated earlier, judges have been leery of sanctioning lawyers
under the third and fourth stages delineated in DR 7-107, and have
instead attempted to use other techniques to ensure that media cov-
erage does not endanger fair trials. Why? Because regardless of
the appropriate First Amendment standard, it is extremely difficult to
show after the fact that a lawyer knew or reasonably should have
known that a statement would be a "reasonably likely" threat/"'seri-
ous and imminent threat"/'clear and present danger" to the admin-
istration of justice; a judge, in light of this situation, undoubtedly
finds it far easier to regulate at the outset what may and may not be
disclosed.
Whether sweeping judicial prohibitions are always consistent with
the First Amendment, however, is open to question.18 And yet the
other current alternative of a self-regulating legal profession being
scrutinized after the fact leaves us with an unsatisfactory, "practical"
answer. In the words of one authority on legal ethics: "Our stan-
dard is one of outrageousness. Discipline will be reserved for those
statements that are patently indefensible." 19 0ur profession can
hardly be satisfied with that answer.
Instead we must attempt to design an enforceable and policeable
standard which, at the same time, does not unduly/unconstitution-
ally restrict attorney speech. Let us examine the rule proposed by
the ABA, and see whether it meets those tests.
Proposed Rule 3.6
The proposed rule differs from DR 7-107 in two significant ways.
First, it employs as a First Amendment standard a "substantial likeli-
hood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding;" this is
a higher threshold which (theoretically at least)20 would ensure
more First Amendment protection for extra-judicial speech. Sec-
ond, and in my view much more important, the proposed rule does
not differentiate between the four stages of the criminal process;
rather it sets forth what public comments would "ordinarily" fail the
standard, as well as identifying what may be publicly stated "with-
out elaboration."
Restricting Lawyer Comment on Pending Litigation, 65 Cownmi L. Rv. 1106
(1980).
Nonetheless, commentators continue to debate and analyze these different stan-
dards. See, e.g., Matheson, The Prosecutor, The Press and Free Speech, 58 FoRD-
HAm L. Rzv. 865, 899-904, 922-24 (1990).
18. Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)(unanimous Court, per
curiam, struck down judicial order restraining media coverage of a criminal trial).
19. Gillers, Free Press-Fair Trial Debate - A New Slant on an Old Practice,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1987, at 1, 4.
20. See note 17 supra.
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Comments that would fail under Rule 3.6 are simple to under-
stand and clearly articulated. Without abridgement, they would be
public statements concerning:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of
a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarcer-
ation, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the exist-
ence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by
a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a
statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the
refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or
the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be
presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or sus-
pect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in
incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if dis-
closed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, un-
less there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge
is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent
until and unless proven guilty.
From the standpoint of the least restrictive burden on speech, this
enumeration meets the Constitutional tenets of clarity, precision and
narrowness.2 1 From an enforcement prospective, the listed items
would be effective for those same reasons. Any lawyer, whether
prosecutor or defense counsel, would be on notice as to what "ordi-
narily" would be deemed violative prior to stepping before a
21. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, supra, 552 F.2d at 251-52.
A commentator has recently written that certain provisions of Rule 3.6 are "open
to vagueness and overbreadth questions," citing the bar on opinions as to guilt or
innocence of a criminal defendant. See Matheson, supra note 17, at 902-03. As
support for this assertion, Professor Matheson questioned whether a statement made
by President Bush, in which he paraphrased advice given to him by the Attorney
General on the strength of the government's case against Manuel Noriega, would
be violative of the Rule. Id. at 903 n.216. This analysis is wide off the mark for at
least three reasons. First, the President is not a lawyer and thus is not subject to
disciplinary action. Second, the Attorney General's legal advice to the President
(his client) is obviously not something the Attorney General "would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication." Finally, and most important,
had an actual prosecutor commented to the press that he or she had a "strong case"
against a particular defendant, I believe there is no vagueness or ambiguity in the
Rule - the statement would clearly be in violation.
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microphone - whether it be at the indictment stage, during trial or
after a verdict.22 And by that presumption, the burden would shift
to the attorney of demonstrating why the circumstances of the partic-
ular case mandated what was said in public.23
What could be commented on in public is equally clear and un-
ambiguous under Rule 3.6; in fact so much so that I am at a loss as
to how to explain them textually any more fully than they are listed.
In general, lawyers would be allowed to "state without elaboration":
(1) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the
general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense
involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the
persons involved;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto; and/or
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person in-
volved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likeli-
hood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.
And in criminal cases, lawyers (mainly prosecutors) could also re-
port on:
(1) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the
accused;
(2) if the accused has not been apprehended, information neces-
sary to aid in apprehension of that person;
22. Although some have taken the position that there is no harm in public com-
ments post-trial and pro-verdict, there is a body of evidence that judges are not
immune to the effects of publicity. See Note, The Appearance of Justice: fudges'
Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STj. L. Rzv. 89, 120,
135-36 (1985); see also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 396 (1947)(Jackson, J.,
dissenting)("nothing in my experience or observation confirms the idea that [a
judge] is insensitive to publicity"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 300
(1941)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)("If it is true of juries it is not wholly untrue of
judges that they too may be 'impregnated by the environing atmosphere.' "); 75
A.B.A.J. 30, Aug., 1989 (remarks of Chief Justice Rehnquist: "Judges ... can no
more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than can people
working at other jobs.").
23. Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra, at 251-52.
Professor Matheson, in his recent article, is critical of the presumption construc-
tion of Rule 3.6, questions the nature and level of evidence needed to overcome
the presumption, and argues that it is constitutionally defective because it "may
mistakenly sanction speech that should be protected." Matheson, supra note 17, at
920. To the extent these criticisms are valid, they would apply with at least equal
force to DR 7-107. Furthermore, with respect to his last criticism, Rule 3.6 pre-
sumptions arguably provide greater First Amendment protection than does DR 7-
107 (see supra nn. 17 & 20 and accompanying text), which has already been up-
held as constitutional.
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(3) the fact, time and place of arrest; and/or
(4) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies
and the length of the investigation.
Again, the clarity, precision and narrowness of these items argue
strongly for their effectiveness.
WHAT CAN WE EXPECT
Rule 3.6 specifically addresses the limitations of DR 7-107, and
thus would appear to be the appropriate vehicle for regulating ex-
tra-judicial speech. Hopefully, it will become the ethical standard
for the legal profession.24 Will it completely ensure fair trials? I am
wary to speculate; several factors must be considered in attempting
to answer that question. First, as a profession, we need to do far
more in accepting as a basic principal that, when there is even a
small chance of endangering a fair trial, using the media - whether
it be in an attempt to gain a tactical advantage or for personal ag-
grandizement - is not ethically acceptable behavior. The mere fact
that punishment is more likely for such conduct will not be suffi-
cient. Second, and related to the first, is that the profession must
make its ethical (and Constitutional) obligations crystal clear to the
media, and thereafter not give in to the seductive temptation of the
klieg lights, multitudinous microphones and ever-present note pads.
And finally, we must recognize that the formidable and related
problem of leaks must also be addressed and pursued. Although
there are existing laws and rules extant to punish such behavior,
they seem to be very difficult to enforce;25- moreover, reporters'
sources have always been well-protected by the courts. Without
seeking to encroach on that protection, we need to be more creative
in eliminating leaks in the criminal justice system. Otherwise, what
we stop lawyers from doing in public will still find its way into the
media, except it will be attributed to "unnamed sources" or "a
source close to the government," etc. 26 Such a result would do little
24. To date, 15 states have adopted Model Rule 3.6; 11 states have adopted the
rule with certain modifications.
25. See note 13 supra.
26. The public leaks on a daily basis, seemingly by both sides, with respect to
the criminal investigation, negotiations and ultimately the terms of the guilty plea of
Drexel .Burnham Lambert Inc., as well as the related investigations involving indi-
viduals, represent a nadir in this area. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Apr. 27, 1989,
A4 (details of a governmental investigation into an individual's trading with
Michael Milken leaked by "individuals familiar with the investigation," notwith-
standing that lawyers for the individual and the government publicly declined com-
ment). Indeed, it reached a point in that case where Mr. Milken's lawyers sought a
court order barring what they claimed were illegal leaks of information by the gov-
ernment. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 15, 1989, A3. In response to that motion,
the judge overseeing the case ordered the Justice Department to investigate
whether the government was in fact the source of the leaks; at the same time, how-
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to ensure that "the most fundamental of all freedoms" is protected. 27
ever, the judge postponed a hearing on the motion itself until after the trial in order
to avoid further publicity about the leaked information, thereby making a fair trial
potentially even more difficult. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 19, 1989, B15.
27. See note 2 supra.

